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Introduction
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) continually make investment decisions, which include seeking new locations, acquiring other firms, merging with other firms, expanding or reducing their existing activities. From a policy perspective, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) location decisions of MNEs are important, as FDI may have a substantial economic impact on both the host and home country of FDI. From a host country perspective, certain empirical evidence points to a positive impact of FDI on economic growth and the possibility of spillover effects to local firms (e.g. Castellani and Zanfei 2006) . Both arguments have been used to justify government policies designed to attract FDI. Among other factors, the FDI location decisions of MNEs may be determined by taxes and production-related tangible (public and private) infrastructure, since both can have an impact on the producer rent of an investment (Richter et al. 1996) . On the one hand an increase in taxes, ceteris paribus, leads to a lower post-tax net present value of an investment and thus to a lower producer rent. On the other hand, if public capital stock is complementary to private capital stock, an increase in production-related tangible infrastructure might increase the producer rent via its contribution to output and labor productivity and hence lower production costs (e.g. Fontagné and Mayer 2005) . Thus, a decrease in taxes or an increase in the infrastructure endowment 1 is capable of increasing FDI. Furthermore, as high taxes and a favorable infrastructure endowment have opposing effects on the profitability of an investment, these two public policy measures should not be analyzed in isolation. Specifically, a country may not lose FDI in the case of a tax increase relative to competitor countries if the country compensates for it with an above average infrastructure endowment. Put differently, MNEs may value higher taxes as a price for better infrastructure (e.g. Haufler 1998 ). The empirical literature on infrastructure and taxes as determinants of FDI is characterized by three main aspects: (1) While many studies deal with taxes comparatively few empirical studies consider the endowment with infrastructure as a determinant of FDI; (2) even fewer studies model the possible interaction effects between taxes and infrastructure, and (3) while these two aspects are valid for the general literature on the determinants of FDI, their significance may become even more pronounced when one examines FDI in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the role of infrastructure and taxes as determinants of FDI in CEECs and on the possible interaction effects between these location factors. Specifically, we test the conditional hypothesis that the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI decreases with an increase in a country's infrastructure endowment. We first expect infrastructure and taxes to be relevant location factors for FDI per se. Second, we expect that the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI, measured as semi-elasticity, indeed decreases with an increase in a country's infrastructure endowment. If empirically confirmed, such results may contribute significantly to the recent literature on determinants of FDI, as they may indicate that tax-rate elasticities of FDI derived without controlling for infrastructure may be biased. More importantly however, our results may confirm that high tax countries can also successfully attract FDI, as governments may compensate for higher corporate taxes by offering foreign investors a more favorable infrastructure endowment.
The paper is structured as follows: section two reviews the related literature. Section three introduces the empirical model and methodology applied and discusses the variables and data used in our empirical analysis. Section four. presents and discusses the results, while section five summarizes and concludes.
Taxes and infrastructure as determinants of FDI
So far, much effort has been put into the analysis of taxation as a determinant of location decisions (e.g. DeMooij and Ederveen 2006 and . DeMooij and Ederveen (2006) carry out a meta-analysis of 35 empirical studies and find a median FDI tax-rate elasticity (semi-elasticity) of about -3 for FDI mainly between homogenous countries (i.e. for FDI from the US to Europe or vice versa, or within the US and the EU). This result implies that a one percentage point reduction of the corporate tax rate will increase FDI by about 3 percent. DeMooij and Ederveen also show that the tax-rate elasticity inter alia crucially depends on the measure of corporate tax burden used. It is well established in the literature that among the various measures proposed (see e.g. OECD 2000 for an overview), forwardlooking effective average tax rates (EATR) in the spirit of Devereux and Griffith (1999) are the best measures for examining the investment decisions of firms. DeMooij and Ederveen (2006) find a tax-rate elasticity of about -5.8 when the conceptually superior EATRs are used. For CEECs find a relatively low tax rate elasticity of about -1.45. A common feature of the studies surveyed is that they use the statutory corporate tax rate (STR) as a measure of corporate tax burden, which is relevant to analyzing incentives to shift profits but not to selecting a particular FDI location. use EATRs at the bilateral level and find higher and statistically significant tax-rates (about -4.5). From these studies one can conclude that low (effective average) corporate tax rates indeed attract FDI in general and FDI in the CEECs in particular. With respect to infrastructure, Gramlich (1994) and Regan (2004) argue that the relevant infrastructure includes transport, communication and electricity production facilities, as well as transmission facilities for electricity, gas and water.
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One of the seminal works examining infrastructure as a determinant in firms' international location decisions is Wheeler and Mody (1992) . Using a comprehensive indicator for "infrastructure quality", this study finds a significant positive effect of high infrastructure quality on FDI. Specifically, the authors state that "agglomeration economies [including infrastructure, authors] are indeed the dominant influence on investor calculations". (p. 57) Goodspeed et al. (2006) explain FDI between a broad range of countries and include the consumption of electric power, the number of mainline telephone connections and a composite infrastructure index (from the World Competitiveness Yearbook) in their regressions. These authors also find a significant positive impact of infrastructure on FDI. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007a) use data on the net stock of public capital provided by Kamps (2006) , which they extend for several countries and to the year 2002 as a proxy for the quantity and quality of infrastructure. They analyze FDI from the US to 18 EU countries and find a significant positive impact of infrastructure on FDI. Mollick et al. (2006) (1) with:
The core model will be augmented by several location factors discussed below. Furthermore, gdpcaphost will be substituted by various factors as outlined in the next subsections leading to an "augmented" panel-gravity model (equ. (2) 
with: m ijt = γ t + α ij + e ijt , whereby lnFDI ijt is the log of FDI outflows from home country i to host country j at time t. lngdphome it is the log of GDP in home country i at time t, and lngdphost jt is the log of the GDP in host country j at time t. lngdpcaphome it is the log of the GDP per capita of home country i at time t and analogously lngdpcaphost jt for host country j. lndist ij is the log of the bilateral distance between capital cities of countries i and j. X ijt are location factors which vary between country pairs over time and W jt are location factors which vary over time and over host countries. γ t are time dummies (TD), α ij are country-pair-specific effects and e ijt is the remainder error term. Devereux and Griffith (1999) . As mentioned above, EATRs are the conceptually proper measure of the corporate income tax burden when dealing with the incentive effects of taxes on investment location decisions. Moreover, using tax rates on a bilateral level is especially relevant for the CEECs as these countries adopted new double-taxation agreements during the transition process and joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. Both developments have had a substantial impact on the effective average tax burden levied on FDI in CEECs. Clearly, as higher taxes ceteris paribus have a negative impact on the profitability of an FDI we expect the tax variable to carry a negative sign. Figure Examining the measurement of infrastructure we have to focus on telecommunication, electricity and transport production facilities due to data restrictions. These are multi-facetted concepts and include many different categories. For example, telecommunications can be described by factors such as the number of fixed lines, the number of mobile phone connections, the number of internet users etc. In order to reduce this complexity we derive infrastructure indices using principal component analysis (PCA; see, e.g. Bortz 2005, chapter 15 ). This strategy has been widely used in empirical studies (e.g. Wheeler and Mody 1992 , Kumar 2001 , Calderón and Servén 2005 . PCA allows reducing the number of variables used in the estimation while still retaining a substantial part of the information contained in the various variables. In particular, four proxies for the infrastructure endowment are derived: (i) a measure of overall infrastructure (infra), (ii) a measure of the telecommunications infrastructure (telecom); (iii) a measure of the transport infrastructure (transport) and (iv) a measure of electricity supply capacity (electricity). Data are derived from various sources. In order to proxy telecommunication production facilities we use per capita data on penetration with telephone mainlines, mobile phones, personal computers, broadband connections to the internet and the number of internet users.
Variables and data
To capture the electricity production facilities we use the annual electricity generation capacity per capita in GWh. Transport production facilities are proxied by the density of railways, motorways, non-motorway-roads and waterways, as well as by the number of major air-and seaports. To this aim, we use information from Eurostat's New Cronos database, the World Bank's "World Development Indicators" database and, most importantly, information from national sources (e.g. statistical yearbooks). All variables are used in logs in order to account for possible non-linearity between them (e.g. Bortz 2005, p. 523) and to control for accelerating growth rates in the telecommunications infrastructure endowment. We use the first principal component obtained by performing the PCA on the pooled observations.
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Note that only one variable is available to proxy the electricity supply capacity. Thus, a PCA cannot be performed and electricity is generated via standardization of the underlying variable (i.e. electricity generation capacity per capita in GWh). Standardization is carried out to make this variable comparable to the other three indices, which also follow a standard normal distribution. Thus, a value of zero indicates an average endowment given the construction of the infrastructure index. Note also that capturing quality aspects is not possible given the existing data (also see Yeaple and Golub 2007 ).
5 Figure 2 shows the development of the index for the overall infrastructure endowment (infra). The figure reveals that each of the host countries considered has substantially improved its infrastructure endowment. However, those countries found at the lower end at the beginning of the period did not change their position by the end of the period. At the same time, Figure  2 signals that some convergence is given. We expect the sign of the various infrastructure variables to be positive as a higher quantity of infrastructure provided reduces production costs and thus leads ceteris paribus to a higher 4 Details on the results of the PCA will be provided upon request. 5 The only quality measure available in panel format for the CEECs included here are "losses" in energy distribution. Yet, according to information given by national statistical offices this variable is calculated as a residual between energy demand and energy supply and thus captures more than pure distribution losses. 6 The appendix includes graphs for the three sub-categories of infrastructure.
profitability of the investment. Table 1 summarizes the discussion of the variables of main interest. Most of the expected signs of the variables are standard in the literature. However, dist, tar and gdpcaphost require brief discussion as their signs are not straightforward. While a larger distance (dist) as a proxy of trade costs may encourage FDI due to high export costs, it may also discourage FDI due to differences in culture and institutions that may increase monitoring and investment costs. Thus, a priori the sign on the distance coefficient is ambiguous (Carr et al. 2001, p. 699) . At the same time, we expect a negative sign for several reasons. First, intra-firm trade flows between parent and affiliate tend to be high in the case of efficiency-seeking FDI, while the costs of re-exporting add to overall costs. Second, a large distance will even have a negative impact on market-seeking FDI if the affiliates are relatively new, since then they typically depend on headquarter services and other intermediate inputs supplied by the parent. Third, the majority of empirical studies revealed a negative impact of distance on FDI. Turning to tariffs, the impact of high tariffs on the volume of FDI received by a country also depends on the underlying motive for FDI, whether it is efficiency or market seeking FDI. In the former case, FDI may be deterred by high tariffs, while in the latter case high tariffs may spur FDI ("tariff-jumping FDI"). Thus, the sign of this variable is again ambiguous a priori, but for similar reasons to those mentioned above we expect a negative sign for tar. Table 2 here Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the various location factors used in the empirical study. As expected, the table reveals pronounced pairwise correlations of gdpcaphost with the infrastructure variables, as well as wages, labprod and risk. Moreover, we find a relatively high correlation between the various infrastructure measures and between labprod and wages. Table 3 here Finally, Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used. It signals that the variability is higher between country-pairs than within country-pairs. Thus, an estimator which does not drop all of the former variability (e.g. the random effects estimator) may be suitable here. Table 4 here
Methodological aspects
Country-pair specific effects can be considered fixed (correlated with explanatory variables) or random (not correlated with explanatory variables). We apply standard Hausman-tests to determine whether the random effects assumption can be maintained. Looking at time effects, we consider these to be fixed as they are likely to be correlated with gdphome, gdphost and gdpcaphome in particular, as time dummies account inter alia for the business cycle and common shocks (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004) . Following Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Egger and Winner (2005) we take the log of all variables denominated in Euros (i.e. priv, wages, labprod) in addition to the core gravity variables (gdphome, gdphost, gdpcaphost, gdpcaphome and dist) . Lagged values of all variables are used to guard against the possibility of reverse causality (e.g. Egger and Winner 2005) and to take into account that FDI flows to the CEECs may rely on lagged rather than contemporaneous information, as argued by Bevan and Estrin (2004) . Furthermore, we conduct a jack-knife analysis with respect to host countries and years included in the sample in order to shed light on the robustness of our results. The novelty of our approach is that we explicitly take into account the interrelation between taxes and infrastructure as determinants of FDI. To capture these interaction effects between beatr and infra we use the product (tax_infra) of these two variables jointly with each single variable in the augmented panel gravity model (equ (2)). The use of interaction terms is justified whenever conditional hypotheses are tested (e.g. Brambor et al. 2006) . We expect that controlling for the interaction between taxes and infrastructure will reduce the sensitivity of FDI to changes in tax rates, i.e. we expect a positive sign on the coefficient of the tax_infra variable. . With the exception of labprod, all of the included variables carry the expected sign and are statistically significant. The insignificance of labprod is due to the inclusion of infra. This is plausible, as labor productivity is crucially determined by infrastructure. Thus infrastructure can be considered as an underlying variable for labor productivity. Indeed, if infra is dropped from this specification, the coefficient of labprod turns positive and almost statistically significant (see m3). Due to its insignificance, labprod is dropped in models m4 to m7. The results derived from these models imply semi-elasticities of about -5 (beatr), +47 (infra), +84 (telecom), +32 (transport) and +10 (electricity). With the exception of electricity all variables are statistically significant. 8 Note that the Hausman-test does not reject the null hypothesis of uncorrelated effects for all estimated specifications (cf . Tables 5 and 6 ). Thus, results are derived based on the random effects estimator. Also, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected throughout. Thus, it is not necessary to model an autoregressive model to avoid dynamic misspecification. As we use FDI outflows rather than FDI stocks this is a plausible result. Moreover, using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors has virtually no impact on the estimated variances. Nevertheless, as stressed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 263) , nothing is lost if robust standard errors are used for the random effects estimator even in the case of spherical residuals. Thus, with the exception of the Hausman-test, robust standard errors are used throughout.
Empirical Results

Models without interaction effects
The estimated tax-rate elasticity is in line with the study by as well as the meta-analysis by DeMooij and Ederveen (2006) outlined above. A one percentage point change, which is about a one standard deviation change, in the index of infrastructure infra would lead to an increase in FDI of 47 percent. A semi-elasticity of +47 appears rather high at first glance. However, considering that our infrastructure index ranges only between -2.5 and 2 for the CEECs included (cf. Figure 2) Table 5 here
Our results clearly show that infrastructure has a direct effect on FDI. While these results are encouraging, the neglect of the interaction between taxation and infrastructure is problematic, particularly from a policy perspective. As outlined above, investors may consider infrastructure endowment as a form of compensation for higher taxes.
Models with interaction effects
Before discussing the results, some points concerning the interpretation of results of models with interaction effects should be considered. First, the coefficients in interaction models no longer show the average effect of the variables entering the interaction effects (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 8) -here beatr and infra. Instead, they show the impact of a marginal change of beatr (infra) when infra (beatr) is evaluated at zero. Zero is usually not an economically meaningful value. (See Brambor et al. (2006, p. 13f .) for a discussion.) Rather, one needs to further evaluate the marginal effect of beatr (infra) on FDI at different, economically meaningful values of infra (beatr). Second, if an insignificant impact of beatr or infra is shown in standard result tables (cf . Table 6 ), one must bear in mind that this represents an insignificant impact of beatr (infra) if infra (beatr) is evaluated at zero. Thus, it does not imply that beatr (infra) could not have a statistically significant impact on FDI at other values of infra (beatr). It is possible for beatr (infra) to have a statistically significant impact on FDI for substantively relevant values of infra (beatr) even when both variables enter insignificantly 9 (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 9) . Third, this latter point also holds for the interaction effect, here tax_infra. Even if its coefficient is not statistically significant, it is possible for the marginal effects of beatr (infra) to be significant for relevant values of infra (beatr) (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 14) . Fourth, in interaction models it is not unusual that one of the interacting variables carries the "wrong" sign with the model nevertheless showing the expected marginal effects (Kennedy 2005, example 8) . The results are shown in Table 6 .
10 Table 6 here Model m8 gives the result for model m4 augmented by tax_infra. The coefficient of beatr does not change much and remains highly statistically significant and the coefficient of tax_infra carries the expected sign. The question we want to answer is "How does the marginal effect of beatr change with the level of infra?" This is shown by Figure 3 . The full black line in Figure 3 depicts the marginal effect of beatr at different levels of infrastructure endowment for m8, while the 90 percent confidence band in Figure 3 allows us to determine the range of values of infra for which the marginal effect of beatr on FDI is statistically significant. 11 The effect of beatr on FDI is negative throughout the whole range of sample values of infra (cf. Turning to infrastructure, Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of infra on FDI at various levels of beatr again based on m8. The impact of infra on FDI is positive if beatr = 0 and it increases with an increase in the tax burden. This, of course, mirrors the results shown by Figure 3 . Furthermore, the impact of infra on FDI is positive throughout the sample range and statistically significantly different from zero for about 98 percent of the sample values of our tax variable. Figure 4 here Finally, models m9 to m12 show the results when different control variables are added to m8. With the exception of risk, these variables enter with the expected signs, yet are statistically insignificant. More importantly, the estimates for beatr, infra and tax_infra do not change 9 See equation 1 in Brambor et al. (2006) . 10 We present results for infra only. Using sub-categories of infrastructure might lead to biased estimates as different types of infrastructure are relevant for FDI. Yet, as expected , the results for sub-categories of infrastructure (telecom, transport, electricity) in m5 to m7 in Table 5 show that telecom has the largest impact on the marginal effect of taxes (highest coefficient on tax_infra). Moreover, each of the coefficients on tax_infra is positively signed. 11 The Stata program which is used to generate Figures 3 and 4 is based on the code made available by Thomas Brambor's homepage.
much upon the inclusion of additional control variables. Thus, model m8 and the results displayed in Figures 3 and 4 are robust with respect to the control variables added.
Jackknife analysis
To evaluate the robustness of the results against the impact of possible host country and period outliers a jackknife analysis excluding host countries and years is conducted. The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8 , whereby the focus lies on the variables of main interest (i.e. beatr, tax_infra, infra, telecom, transport and electricity). The tables report the resulting minimum and maximum values of the coefficient estimates, the country or the year excluded and the model on which the analysis is based. Moreover, the corresponding results from Tables 5 and 6 are displayed in the columns titled "estimates". We find that the results are robust when countries and years are dropped. Only one coefficient changes signs, yet this is for electricity which does not have a statistically significant impact on FDI. Moreover, excluding host countries or years only has a minor impact on the statistical significance of the estimates. Thus, in addition to the results derived from including various control variables (cf. models m9 to m12), the jackknife analysis confirms the robustness of the results. Table 7 here Table 8 here
Summary and Conclusions
This study focuses on two interrelated policy factors, namely taxes and infrastructure, as determinants of FDI. The results show, first, that infrastructure is a relevant location factor for FDI in CEECs. Second, the results imply that among the various types of infrastructure information and communication infrastructure is more important than transport infrastructure and electricity generation capacity. Third, and most importantly, the analysis shows that the tax-rate elasticity of FDI is indeed a decreasing function of infrastructure endowment. The latter generates location-specific and immobile "infrastructure rents", which can be taxed without a loss of FDI. Thus, from a public finance perspective, the income side (taxes) and the expenditure side (infrastructure) of public budgets are clearly interlinked with regard to FDI attraction policies. Countries with an above average infrastructure endowment can -at least in part -afford to finance their infrastructure by taxing corporations. However, countries with an inferior infrastructure endowment most likely have to cut corporate income taxes to receive FDI in the short run. In the medium to the long run these countries should improve their infrastructure position in order to make FDI sustainable. However, this increase in infrastructure endowment needs to be funded mainly by non-corporate income taxes in the short run. Our analysis can be extended in several ways. First of all, the inclusion of infrastructure quality indicators should provide further insights into the role of infrastructure as a determinant of FDI and its impact on the tax-rate elasticity of real multinational activity. Furthermore, the inclusion of further interaction effects of infrastructure and other policy variables (e.g., the institutional environment, employment-protection legislation, education 
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